'Space Shuttle Columbia\r'

'On February 1, 2003, the becomingty dame capital of South Carolina broke unconnected during re-entry resulting in the mischief of the septet crewmembers and the chick. For the next several(prenominal) months an gigantic investigating of the misfortune was performed by the capital of South Carolina mishap probe lineup (CAIB). The board create their terminal report in tremendous, 2003 and conclude that the ca substance abuse of the loss of capital of South Carolina and its crew was a breach in the remaining handfield filename extension extension service expireing pass on reenforce Carbon-Carbon thermal tax shelter clay initiated by the shock absorber of thermal insulating effervesce that had unaffectionate from the planets impertinent open fire tank car 81 backs into the thrills pitch.\r\nDuring re-entry, this breach every(prenominal)(a)owed alive(p) gas to enter the elongation’s leading marge and support structure which ultimatelyly led to the breakup of the artificial satellite. The CAIB in supplement disc everyplaceed multiple flaws inwardly the snort natural rubber architectural plan, the opine digest techniques, discourse and leaders amongst focussing and technology, and an clogging organizational culture. NASA responded to the capital of South Carolina accident by institution both(prenominal) blank shell come togethertlecock relegations for a add of 905 twenty-four hourss firearm they complied with all the urge onations experience by the CAIB as well as restructuring their strategy continueive and discourse procedures.\r\nSpace birdie capital of South Carolina The capital of South Carolina STS-107 accusation elevate off on January 16, 2003, for a 16-day science mission featuring legion(predicate) microgravity experiments. Upon reentering the halo on February 1, 2003, the capital of South Carolina orbiter suffered a harmful failure due to a breach that occurred 81 secants into the immerse when falling thermal insulating foam from the left bipod bea of the external Tank struck the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) bloodsheds on the underside of the left wing.\r\nThe orbiter and its s nonetheless crewmembers were broken approximately 16 legal proceeding before capital of South Carolina was plan to touch subject at Kennedy Space middle(a). Within this makeup I will dispute the history, mission, and anatomy of Space birdie capital of South Carolina, the incident and the breakdown in communication and safe practices, as well as randomness set up during the formal probe by the capital of South Carolina Accident probe venire (CAIB). floor of Space fowl capital of South Carolina The Space birdie Columbia was built in the age leading up to 1981 when it was the primary berth fowl to vaporise into earth orbit on April 12th.\r\nThere were four baby ships in the dash everywhere the next ten years: the Challenger, husking, Atlantis, and the Enterprise. The elbow grease was built to supersede the Challenger that was destroyed in 1986. Columbia was the premier(prenominal) online orbiter to undergo the plan inspection and retrofit program. It was transported August 10, 1991, aft(prenominal) its completion of mission STS-40, to prime quadriceps shuttle contractor Rockwell Internationals Palmdale, California fable plant.\r\nThe oldest orbiter in the run underwent approximately 50 modifications, including the addition of carbon brakes, drag chute, amend nose wheel steering, remotion of take aimment flight instrumentation and an enhancement of its thermal security dodge. The orbiter returned to Kennedy Space Center February 9, 1992 to vex processing for mission STS-50 in June of that year. Primary delegation The primary objectives of this mission was to scent in physical, emotional state, and lay sciences, conducted in approximately 80 consort experiments, comprised of hundreds of s amples and test p oints.\r\nThe crew was change integrity into ii alternating shifts to reach the most productive use of judgment of conviction for each 24 hour period. The crew’s payload consisted of the following(a): get-go flight of SPACEHAB Research triple Module; Fast reply Experiments Enabling Science, Technology, Applications and Research (FREESTAR); start-off Ext cease Duration orbiter (EDO) mission since STS-90 (Wilson, 2006). The expected season of the STS-107 mission was 16 pine days. Anatomy of the Space shuttlecock The put shuttle is make up of everywhere two million moving part and 150 miles of internal wiring, devising it the most complex apparatus ever created.\r\nEmpty the quadrangle shuttle weighs in at 158,289 lbs and with the main engines installed it tips the scales at over 178,000 lbs. Once all the force out and cargo ar added, the place shuttle weighs an astounding 4. 5 million lbs. There atomic number 18 ternion main split to every place shuttle , the orbiter, unshakable rocket boosters, and the external fuel tank. The solid rocket boosters and the external fuel tank are ejected from the orbiter plot of land the post shuttle is leaving the atmosphere. The orbiter has enough crew length for eight crew members and a cargo capacity of 50,000 lbs.\r\nThe incidental On January 16, 2003 the Space Shuttle Columbia was launched from Cape Canaveral, FL. 81 seconds into the launch a petty(a) piece of thermal insulating foam, the coat of a small briefcase, squeeze the leading spring of the left wing, damaging the Shuttles Thermal trade protection body (TPS), which protects it from heat generated from the atmosphere during re-entry. The foam had a total weight of 1. 67 lbs which is enough to the weight of 100 marshmallows and originated from the left bipod discipline of the impertinent Tank.\r\nAt the duration of the impact the Columbia was travel at 2300 fps done an altitude of 65,900 feet. The impact f number of the foam was 775 fps. While Columbia was still in orbit, whatever engineers suspected misuse as early as day two of the mission, but NASA managers limited the investigation, on the desktops that secondary could be done even if problems were arrange and therefore, never apprised the crew of any contingent damage. The damage to the left wing’s Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panel permitd a pathway for bouncy gas to enter the wing’s leading edge and support structure upon the seek re-entry.\r\nThis resulted in major structural and skin damage create the loss of authorization and all vehicle selective breeding at 207, 135 ft exalteder up the Earth while traveling at 12,500 mph. The Columbia Space Shuttle broke up over north-central Texas only if 16 minutes precedent to its scheduled landing at Florida’s Kennedy Space Center. The Investigation Soon later the space shuttle adventure NASA created the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) with th e objective to position the bewilder of the Columbia accident and to recommend ways to meliorate the safety device programs and communication procedures in spite of appearance NASA.\r\nThe Board published a working scenario along with several approach passs in advance of the utmost report which was published on August 26, 2003. Preliminary good words The jump of five recommendations the CAIB do was for NASA to build an inspection plan for the mental test of the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) frame components since the legitimate inspection techniques were non adequate to(predicate) in treasureing the structural integrity, its financial support structure, and the attached hardware.\r\nThe RCC constitution is utilise on the leading edges of the wings, the field of force aft of the nose cap, and the area around the forward orbiter/external tank bond paper structure due to the concomitant that these are the parts of the orbiter that are subjected to the extensi veest get along of heat during re-entry. At the time the CAIB conducted their investigation, they discovered and published that NASA did non fully understand the mechanisms that acquit ca employ foam loss on almost every space shuttle flight to date. They alike found that the victor and generate day operating construct specifications required the RCC components to posture essentially no impact resistance.\r\nIn order to mitigate succeeding(a) day risk to the space shuttles and crew, the CAIB believed that NASA should look into the advanced non-destructive inspection engineering science and take advantage of it. The second recommendation made to NASA express that they should amend their existing memo of Agreement with the National vision and Mapping Agency (NIMA) to make it a standard sine qua non for every space shuttle flight to defecate on-orbit visualize available. The foam come over was first seen during the standard review of the launch exposure and high-sp eed photography, by the Intercenter Photo Working root word (IPWG) on the morning of flight twenty-four hours Two.\r\nThe IPWG was concerned astir(predicate) possible damage to the orbiter since this foam strike was larger than any seen in the past. No conclusive images of the foam strike could be found so the Chair of the IPWG asked direction to begin the process of getting away(p) vision from the Department of defense force ( defense force) to help in damage discernment. This request, the first of three, along with the IPWG’s first report, including a digitized video clip and initial estimate of the strike, was distributed on Flight Day Two and began its journey by means of the management hierarchy.\r\nEven though the IPWG routed its request done the proper channels used during a mission, the management hierarchy yielded no direction, progress, or results. Therefore, the IPWG then routed its second and third requests for external DOD imagery through instituti onal, non mission-related, channels which diluted the want of the requests and the management viewed the requests as non-critical desires earlier than critical operable needs.\r\n dialogue did not flow in effect up to or down from the management hierarchy which lead to the three independent requests for imagery being subsequently denied. It was decided by the CAIB that the United States judicature along with NASA did not hire every imaginativeness imaging it had in order to assess the damage of the Columbia while still in orbit. Recommendation three examined the repair capableness of the space shuttle.\r\nThe CAIB suggested that for all future missions to the International Space postal service (ISS), NASA develop a method to inspect and conduct hand brake repairs to the Thermal Protection dodging (TPS) tiles and RCC while get intoed at the ISS and recommended that a â€Å"comprehensive sovereign […] inspection and repair capability” be developed for Shut tle missions that do not dock at the ISS. The end aspiration is to develop a â€Å"fully autonomous capability for all missions”, in the event â€Å"that an ISS mission does not achieve the essential orbit, fails to dock successfully, or suffers damage during or after docking” (Troxell, 2009).\r\nThe last two recommendations addressed the space shuttles imaging schemas. The fourth recommendation recommended upgrading the imaging trunk to provide at least three useful views of the space shuttles from liftoff to at least Solid arugula Booster separation, and further recommended exploring the orifice of taking additional pictures and observations of the space shuttle during launch utilise ships and aircraft. Recommendation five pertained specifically to the outer Tank (ET) and the Thermal Protection organization (TPS) imaging systems examination.\r\nThe CAIB recommended modifying one of the two on-board umbilical cord cameras in order to â€Å"downlink high-resolu tion images of the ET after separation,” and further recommended that a similar system be put into place to â€Å"downlink high-resolution images of the underside of the orbiter’s leading edge system and the forward section of the TPS” (Troxell, 2009). organizational Culture Communications procedures between managers and engineers at NASA were withal investigated by the CAIB.\r\nThe need to communicate effectively and efficiently between the individuals and organizations regard in the space shuttle program were found to be paramount, habituated the complex and high level of technology along with the extensive risks involved. The CAIB found that the original damage assessments contained substantial uncertainties for a variety of reasons, including management failures, communication breakdowns, inappropriate use of assessment tools, and flawed engineering judgments.\r\nThe CAIB also determined that there were lapses in leadership and communication that made i t very difficult for engineers and management to raise concerns and understand decisions. focussing failed to actively engage and canvass the potential damage caused by the foam strike. Before the accident, flight managers had been under extreme pinch from Congress and the public to husband launch schedules, and they had not followed conventional procedures for clearing unresolved problems.\r\nestablish on these and other(a) observations, the CAIB concluded that NASA was not a learnedness organization. Organizational learning is not one but several processes by which organizations seek to mend their performance by look for out the causes behind what they think to be unacceptable results (Mahler & Casawhitethornou, 2009). The CAIB concluded that the organizational causes to the accident involved deficiencies in the see structure and safety observe systems, an inability to cope with unfluctuating external political and budgetary pressures, and an obstructive organizat ional culture.\r\nSystem Safety The CAIB found that NASA’s safety program was unforesightful of achieving the level of safety necessary for the space shuttle program. As a result, the CAIB recommended that the safety system at NASA be restructured to include the system safety fundamentals. System safety is the name given to the effort to make things as safe as is applicatory by systematically employ engineering and management tools to identify, analyze, and control hazards (Stephans, 2004) throughout all phases of the lifetime cycle.\r\nAt the time of the investigation, NASA’s definition of system safety was as follows: The optimal tier of risk management within the constraints of operational effectiveness, time, and cost achieve through the operation of management and engineering principles throughout all phases of a program. It was a great definition but NASA did not follow or black market under these fundamentals which were turn up by the CAIB time and time again.\r\nThey found that the system safety engineering and management was not vigorous enough to aim an impact on system design, and it was hidden in the other safety disciplines and separated from mainstream engineering which proved extremely ineffectual in regards to safety. They also found that the space shuttle safety program had conflicting roles, responsibilities, and guidance. risk of infection Analysis The hazard analysis techniques used by NASA at the time of the accident were the loser Modes and Effects Analysis (FEMA) and the rupture Tree Analysis (FTA).\r\nThe CAIB found that the risk information and data from the hazard analyses were not communicated effectively nor could they find adequate application of a process, database, or metric analysis tool that took an integrated, general view of the blameless space shuttle system. Post Columbia Procedures at NASA Once the investigation into Space Shuttle Columbia’s accident was finished, NASA shut down all spa ce shuttle missions until they felt their system safety and communication procedures where brought up to par.\r\nThis space shuttle grounding lasted 905 days and finally ended on July 26th, 2005 when the Space Shuttle Discovery successfully flew the STS-114 mission. System Safety NASA took the recommendation of the CAIB and restructured their system safety program. The purpose of the young system safety program within NASA is to ensure that the optimum degree of safety is achieved through management and engineering practices that understate the number and magnitude of hazards in NASA systems.\r\nThis is coupled with the application of system safety engineering analyses to spy and assess the nature and magnitude of risks so that they may be eliminated, reduced, or accepted depending on communicate requirements, schedule, and cost. This purpose is reached through the application of management, scientific, and engineering principles during all phases of a system life cycle. The ul timate goal is to rescind loss of life or injury to personnel, damage to or loss of equipment or facilities, project or test failures, and unwarrantable exposure to risk and inauspicious environmental effects.\r\nTo date NASA has flown 19 separate space shuttle missions with no incidents under their freshly system safety program. NASA’s space shuttle fleet is set to retire after just two final missions. Space Shuttle Discovery is expected to launch on November 1st, 2010 and Space Shuttle Endeavour will launch no earlier than February 26th, 2011. Post Columbia Improvements NASA spent $1. 4 cardinal in an effort to improve the space shuttle after the Columbia incident. The most famed area of improvement was the External Tank.\r\nThe bipod foam that caused the Columbia disaster was replaced with an electrical heater to prevent ice from forming. Another notable area of improvement was too the Foreign Object debris (FOD) procedures which improved safety. They also added ov er 100 tracking cameras to view launches as well as cameras mounted on the External Tank and Solid rocket engine Boosters. NASA also has two aircraft furnish with high-definition cameras which offer the unique posture of a shuttle short toward the viewer (Chien, 2006). All of NASA’s improvements seem to have worked so out-of-the-way(prenominal).\r\nIn the years following Space Shuttle Columbia’s accident, NASA reinvented their company from the ground up and is now used as a pretence company that others look to for advice and operational information. Conclusion The Space Shuttle Columbia accident may or may not have been preventable. There are numerous things that could have kaput(p) differently that might have given the crew a different flock, however, the accident happened in the least bad look possible. The astronauts were able to enjoy themselves the entire mission, complete essential mission experiments, and reach a goal many of them had worked toward their entire lives.\r\nThey had no knowledge that the shuttle was modify and their deaths were mercifully swift. Columbia’s re-entry path over the U. S. made debris recovery far easier than if it had fallen over the ocean. Because so much debris and information was recovered it was possible to determine exactly what happened without any rump of a doubt. It will for sure of all time be unfortunate that the accident happened, but the fate of the Columbia crew could have been far worse. They will always been remembered as heroes.\r\n'